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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF U T A H
\
Plaintiff-Appellant, I
[ Case No.
VS

*

f

13845

RICHARD ARTHUR CHAMBERS, \
Defendant-Respondent. J

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from the order denying plaintiff's motion for order staying execution of expungement enteredi on September 4, 1974, in the above entitled action
DISPOSITION IN T H E LOWER COURT
On the 8th day of July, 1974, pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Cocje Ann. Sec. 77-35T17 (1953)
1
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the lower court in Criminal Case No. 1372 and 1378
allowed the defendant to withdraw his former plea of
"guilty" and dismissed those complaints and in addition
thereto ordered the records of criminal cases numbered
1370 to 1379, all of which had been dismissed, to be
expunged. On the 22nd day of July, 1974, the County
Attorney for Cache County, B. H . Harris, filed a
motion for order to stay execution of expungement
order until the necessary time has elapsed (pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1973) in
criminal cases numbered 1370 to 1379. On the 4th day
of September, 1974, the court made its order denying
the motion, stating that Section 77-35-17.5 (enacted in
1973) was not applicable and that he had acted pursuant to Section 77-35-17.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Respondent requests that this court sustain the
lower court's order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Richard Chambers, Mayor of Logan
City, on and after the 17th day of January, 1972, was
charged with various separate complaints with numerous counts within each complaint, in the City Court
of Logan. There were ten separate cases filed. Under
normal practice eight of the ten would have been filed
under one complaint. They all involved a time when
2
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the Mayor was in office and related to the handling of
public funds. Why eight of the ten were filed separately no one will know unless the County Attorney
felt the publicity of the numbers would help his cause
publicly. Evidently his guess was right for it brought
him an appearance on television.
With the number of cases filed and the publicity
given before trial by the local press, radio and television and after the defendant was bound over to the
District Court, a motion for change of venue was filed
which was granted, and the cases were transferred to
Box Elder County District Court for trial.
During the preliminary hearings all charges of
grand larceny were dismissed. There being no evidence
to support them, which the County Attorney must have
known when he made the complaints, yet, he placed
the same in the complaints and referred to the eight
counts of grand larceny on television.
When the cases were transferred to Box Elder
County, Judge Christoffersen disqualified himself and
invited Judge D. Frank Wilkins to preside and J a y
Banks, the District Attorney for tlje Third District,
took over for David Sorenson of the First District.
On the 4th day of April, 1972, a hearing was held
in Brigham City before the Honorable D . Frank Wilkins and the defendant in Criminal Case No. 1372
entered his plea of guilty to the charge of "Making a
Profit Out of Public Money" (R. 51) and in Criminal
Case No. 1378 he entered his plea to "Misusing Public

3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Funds" (R. 51); on this same day the court dismissed
all of the other cases on motion of the District Attorney
concurred in by the defendant. (T. 18-19).
In Criminal No. 1372 and also No. 1378 the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the
Utah State Prison from 0-5 years and placed on probation on condition that he serve one year in the Box
Elder County Jail; both sentences to run concurrently
(R. 22 and R. 82). H e commenced his incarceration
April 24,1972.
"
On August 21, 1972, a hearing was held before
Judge Wilkins (R. 54) and Mr. Chambers was placed
on probation for one year and released from the Box
Elder County Jail.
On July 8, 1974, in Cases 1372 and 1378 (R. 60)
we have:
"The record shows according to records of Adult
Probation and Parole Department — defendant
successfully dismissed from probation."
and after a hearing the order of July 8, 1974, was
signed by the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, pursuant to Section 77-35-17 Utah Code Annotated.
(1953).
Thereafter the vendetta carried on by the County
Attorney, B. H . Harris, was again renewed and his
motion for order to stay execution of expungement
order until the necessary statutory time has elapsed,
was filed. When his motion was denied he sought the
aid of the Attorney General on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E STATE OF U T A H HAS NOT PRED*
ICATED ITS A P P E A L ON ANY GROUND
AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE AS R E Q U I R E D
BY SECTION 77-39-4 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AND SAID PURPORTED APP E A L MUST BE DISMISSED.
The legislature of this state has decreed the circumstances wherein the State of Utah may appeal in
criminal cases. The grounds for appeal are enumerated
by Utah Code Annotated §77-39-4 (1953). This section states:
"77-39-4 Appeal by state, in what cases. — An
Appeal may be taken by the state:
(1) From a judgment of dismissal in favor of
the defendant upon a motion to quash the information or indictment.
(2) From an order arresting judgment
(3) From an order made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the state.
(4) From an order of the court directing the
jury to find for the defendant."
It is obvious that grounds 1, 2 and 4 enumerated
above, have no bearing on this appeal. The only pos*
sible ground under which the state could Jxope to squeeze
in on this appeal would be number 3:
"iFrom an order made after judgment affecting
the substantial rights of the {state/'
5
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I n State v. Callahan, 26 U2d 304, 488 P2d 1048
(1971) the Supreme Court of the State of Utah cited
Section 77-39-4 and held that the State of Utah in
order to appeal must come within the provisions of
this section. The court then held that since the State
had not predicated its appeal upon any of the grounds,
the appeal must be dismissed. See, also, Hartman v.
Weggeland, 19 U2d 229, 429 P2d 978 (1967).
In Callahan, supra, the State asserted that there
was an order "made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the state." The state there urged that
the trial court's decision holding invalid the delegation
of authority to enact regulations to the Board of Parks
and Recreation did affect the substantial rights of the
state. The court, in spite of a dissenting opinion, rejected this assertion, and dismissed the appeal. The
confurring opinion pointed out that if the state was
fearful of similar rulings it could cause a declaratory
judgment action to be filed to determine whether the
legislature made a constitutional delegation of authority
to the Board of Parks and Recreation.
In view of the Callahan decision, it would seem
that if the state seriously believes Utah Code Ann.
§77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1973) supercedes Sec. 77-35-17 and
if it fears similar rulings, it should bring a declaratory
judgment action to determine the relationship of the
two sections.
I t is further pointed out that the plaintiff's objection to expungiement dated July 5, 1974 (R. 30) and
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the plaintiff's motion to stay execution of expungement order dated July 22, 1974 (R. 36) listed only
one reason for objection, that reason being that Section 77-35-17.5 requires a five year waiting period.
At the trial level the state did not assert that the
court abused its discretion; the state did not assert that
the guilty plea should not be withdrawn and the complaints dismissed; the state did not assert the expunging order was not compatible with the public interest;
nor did the state assert that there was anything in the
defendant's background to indicate he had not been
rehabilitated. Courts have recognized that parties who
fail at trial to make timely objections stating thje
reasons therefore, lack standing to raise different reasons for the first time on appeal. See State v. Valdez,
19 U2d 426, 432 P2d 53 (1967). The state's sole assertion was that a newly enacted statute, U.C.A. Sec.
77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1973) required a five year waiting
period before expunging the record of the defendant.
There are no "substantial rights of the state" involved
in this appeal. The state therefore has no right to appeal and this court should follow the Callahan decision
and dismiss this appeal.

POINT II
U T A H C O D E A N N O T A T E D SEC. 77-35-17
(1953) W A S N O T R E P E A L E D B Y T H E E N A C T M E N T OF U T A H CODE A N N O T A T E D
SEC. 77-35-17.5 ( S U P P . 1973)
7
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Utah Code Annotated Section 77-35-17 (1953)
states as follows:
"77-35-17. Suspension of sentence — Probation
— Conditions of probation — Power of court to
dismiss or discharge defendant — Upon a plea of
guilty or conviction of any crime or offense, if
it appears compatible with the public interest,
the court having jurisdiction may suspend the
imposition or the execution of sentence and may
place the defendant on probation for such period
of time as the court shall determine.
The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation period, and may revoke or
modify any condition of probation. While on
probation, the defendant may be required to pay,
in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the
time of being placed on probation; may be required to make restitution or reparation to the
aggrieved party or parties for the actual damages or losses caused by the offense to which the
defendant has pleaded guilty or for which conviction was had; and may be required to provide
for the support of his wife or others for whose
support he may be legally liable. Where it appears to the court from the report of the probation agent in charge of the defendant, or otherwise\, that the defendant has complied with the
conditions of such probation, the court may if it
be compatible with the public interest either upon
motion of the district attorney or of its own motion terminate the sentence or set aside the plea
of guilty or conviction of the defendant and dismiss the action and discharge the defendant"
(emphasis added)
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The reason behind the provision of this section allowing a guilty plea to be withdrawn and the complaint to be dismissed as stated by the court in State
v. Schreiber, 121 Utah 653, 245 P2d 222, 224 (1952) is:
". . . for the purpose of permitting the court
under unusual circumstances and for good cause
to expunge the record of the crime." (emphasis
added).
I t is clear that Section 77-35-17 (1953) allows the
expungement of a defendant's record and in conjunction with such power a court may issue whatever order
it feels necessary to carry out its decision.
The state's contention that U.C.A. 77-35-17.5
(Supp. 1973) must be given effect is clearly erroneous.
The fact that both sections deal with the same subject
matter does not mean that one section supercedes another. This general rule was recognized in Davis v.
King County, 77 Wash 2d 930, 468 P2d 679 (1970)
where the Washington Court stated:
"Where two legislative enactments relate to the
same subject matter and are not actually in conflict, they should be interpreted to give meaning
and effect to both."
Even the most cursory reading of 77-35-17 and 77-3517.5 reveals that the two sections are not in conflict.
The same type of contention the state makes here
was raised in the cases of State v. Judd, 27 U2d 79,
493 P2d 604 (1972) and State v. Ahram, 27 U2d 266,
495 P2d 313 (1972). In these eases it was urged that
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the Uniform Act on Paternity U.C.A. 78-45a-l (1953)
repeated or superceded the provision of the Bastardy
Act U.C.A. 77-60-1 (1953). This contention was rejected in both cases. The court in Judd cited the applicable rule of construction from McCoy v. Severson
118 Utah 502, 508, 222 P2d 1058 (1956):
' "It is a rule of statutory construction that where
there are two or more statutes dealing with the
same subject matter they will be construed so as
to maintain the integrity of both. Repeal by implication is not effected unless the terms of the
later enacted law are irreconcilable with the
former."
There is absolutely nothing to indicate that the
legislature attempted to supercede or repeal 77-35-17.
The Schreiber case, supra, is a long standing decision
governing expungement and should the legislature have
decided to repeal the statute they could have expressly
provided for its repeal. There is nothing to indicate
either, expressly or impliedly that the legislature intended to repeal 77-35-17. I t is therefor clear that both
statutes are in effect and while each may have different procedures, both statutes may be used for expungement.
POINT III
T H E T R I A L COURT CORRECTLY H E L D
T H A T T J I E PROVISIONS OF U T A H CODE
A N N . §77-35-17 (1953) G O V E R N E D T H E D E FENDANT'S EXPUNGEMENT PROCEEDINGS.
10
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On July 8, 1974, the District Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17 (1953) ordered that the
defendant's plea be withdrawn, the complaints be dismissed and the records be expunged (R. 33-35). The
Cache County Attorney then filed an objection (R. 36)
and on August 6, 1974, the District Court issued a
Memorandum Decision stating:
"As previously stated in the court's order, the
basis for expungement was not on the basis of
Section 77-35-17.5 but was on the basis of the
previous section not repealed, Section 77-35-17,
for the reason that the conviction in this case
occurred prior to the enactment of 77-35-17.5
and the court feels that, therefore, Section 7735-17 is the applicable statute and the five years
would then not be in effect (R. 42)"
Pursuant to the Memorandum Decision, the court,
on September 4, 1974, signed an order denying a stay
for expunging the record (R. 43, 44).
The record shows the defendant made full restitu^tion of all money on January 5, 1972 (T.9 and 10),
and defendant entered a plea of guilty on April 4,
1972 (T. 1 through 19), was sentenced on April 18,
1972 (R. 53), was incarcerated from April 24, 1972 to
August 21, 1972 (R. 53, 54) and served probation
from August 21, 1972, to October 9, 1973 (R. 24 and
32). From October 9, A973, to July 8, 1974, the defendant had been successfully employed and had lived
an exemplary life. All of this was known to the trial
court who, being aware of the circumstances ordered
the expungement pursuant to 77-35-17. On May 8,
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1973, U.C.A. Section 77-35-17.5 (Supp. 1973) went
into effect over one year from the date the defendant
was originally sentenced, and well after the defendant
had been rehabilitated and had begun a new life for himself and family.
The state, in its brief, attempted to show that the
trial court committed error in holding that the provision of 77-35-17.5 applied. Essentially, the state
asserted that the enactment of 77-35-17.5 was not an
ex post facto law and that statutory construction requires that a specific statute govern over a general
statute.
The landmark decision of Colder v. Bull, 3 Dall
386, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) set forth, among others, the
following rule for determining an ex post facto law:
"Every law that changes punishment and inflicts
a greater punishment, than the law annexed to
the crime when committed."
This principal remains essentially unchanged to this
present time.
The difficulty in deciding whether a law is ex post
facto lies in determining whether it changes punishment. In order to make this determination certain
courts have given labels to the effect of a law upon a
defendant. For example courts have stated that if a
defendant has a "right" then passage of new legislation is ex post facto, but if a defendant had only an
"expectation" or his "right" to allowances was a matter
of "grace" then new legislation is not ex post facto. See
12
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Graham v. Thompson, 246 F2d 805, (10th Cir. 1957).
The temptation to place labels and then decide on the
basis of a label sheds little light on the real question of
whether it increases punishment to a defendant.
In People v. Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702, 328 P2d 777,
(1958) the court stated that a statute must be considered to be ex post facto if it alters the situation of
the accused to his disadvantage. (See also In re Jones,
500 P2d 690, 692 (Wyo. 1972).
The case of In Be Griffin, 48 Cal. Rptr. 183, 408
P2d 959, 961 (1965) dealt with a somewhat complicated factual situation, but the effect of a statutory
amendment was to increase the minimum time under
which the defendant was inelligible for parole. The
court did not try to say parole was a "right" or parole
was a "matter of grace" but rather the court faced the
issue squarely by stating:
"Whatever the technical nature of a parole may
be, from a realistic point of view it is our opinion
that such a statute increased the punishment
"
In the case before this court it makes no real sense
to say the defendant had no "right" to have his record
expunged, or to say that expungement was a matter of
"grace" or "discretion" to the court. To paraphrase
the California court, whatever the technical nature of
expungement may be, from a realistic poiiit of view,
forcing this defendant to wait five years for expungement increases his punishment. After fully complying
with his sentence and probation, and after making full
13
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restitution this defendant has begun a new productive
life. H e has become employed and is again a contributting member of society. The state for some reason, now
desires to prolong and delay the time when he can have
his record expunged. From a realistic point of view
this is definitely an increase in punishment for until
his record is expunged he is denied his voting rights
and his right to hold public office. (See Const, of Utah
Art. IV, Sec. 6).
But, regardless of whether the act is deemed to
be ex post facto3 rules of statutory interpretation demand that the provisions of 77-35-17 take effect over
77-35-17.5.
In criminal eases it is widely recognized that where
two statutes #iay impose different punishments, a defendant is entitled to the lesser penalty even though the
greater penalty may have been most recently enacted.
See State v. Shondel, 22 U2d 343, 453 P2d 146 (1969)
and State v Fair 23 U2d 34, 456 P2d 168 (1969). In
view of these decisions it is clear that in criminal punishment cases this rule also prevails over the rule that
the specific statute prevails over the general statute.
In addition Utah law recognizes that when a defendant is faced with alternative choices under a statute,
he may comply by choosing the least burdensome alternative. This was recognized in Ringwood v. State,
8 U2d 287, 289, 333 P2d 943 (1959) where this court
stateci:
14
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"We are aware of the requirements of our law
that our statutes are to be given a liberal interpretation to effectuate their purposes. This having been said, however, it must also be recognized that where a statute charges one with a
duty or imposes a burden or a penalty, it must
do so with sufficient clarity and definiteness that
one of ordinary intelligence will understand what
he is required to do. And in case of alternative
choices, he can comply by selecting the one which
is the least burdensome or least offensive to him."
(footnotes omitted).
Finally, district courts have long been recognized
as having wide discretion in matters pertaining to sentencing, probation and expungement. The record is totally barren of any facts to disclose that it would not
be compatible with the public interest to expunge the
defendant's records. Surely in the absence of any evidence it is highly presumptuous of the state to assert
the trial court did not know what was compatible with
the public interest. From his advantaged position, as
a member of the community, as a person in contact
with the probation department, and as a public official,
the trial court correctly held that it would be compatible
with the public interest to expunge the record of this
defendant.

CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that the decision of the
trial court was correct aijd that the trial court properly
15
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ordered the record expunged, therefore the trial qourt's
decision should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Walter G- Mann
Attorney for respondent
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